Google’s Conceit

24 06 2019

Mountain View, California

My problem with the O’Keefe docdump and expose on the Goolag:

It’s Google’s conceit.

People are still eating the rotten dog food that tech swayed 2016, because the false notion that tech swayed 2012 wasn’t adequately refuted in terms of full public understanding.

Whatever happens in 2020, presuming there’s a 2020 in the way we think there will be, will have nothing to with Google, Facebook or Twitter, or any such.  I predict that whatever happens 2020 will happen because of the same old fashioned time honored political factors that caused the binary outcome in 2016, 2012, the dog catcher election Podunkville in 1937, and everything in between.

I suppose what it’s going to take is for Google et al. to “crack down” as hard as they think they can, Trump wins anyway, then people finally figure out that tech doesn’t matter that much.

In a Roundabout Way

21 03 2018

West Palm Beach, Florida

Rush, today:

So they’re bragging about it, 332 electoral votes, and they think that social media did it. You know, Jim Geraghty, our old buddy at National Review, he raised a great question about all this. Let me ask all of you sitting across the glass and all of you here in this esteemed audience. Brian, Dawn, and Mr. Snerdley, let’s just for the sake of it say that you’re on social media, that you’re using Twitter and Facebook, and you get one of these ads. And this ad is trying to persuade you to vote for Hillary in 2016. Is such an ad gonna work on you?

Three people are shaking their heads in there. The point being just how effective is this stuff anyway? There’s a dangerous downside to this that’s gonna lead to the government regulating even more of what you and I are able to know and access. Because that’s happening here is that the American people are being portrayed as a bunch of pure idiots, literal dolts, and they’re all out there playing around on social media. And they’re telling each other lies about how great their lives are and they’re bragging about this and bragging about that.

And here comes this Messina guy, and he says (paraphrasing), “Yeah, our campaign on social media garnered 332 electorate votes.” What they’re trying to say is that their brilliant campaign, their brilliant use of social media made people vote a certain way. And I ask you to go do the same thing. Talk to your friends who you know were just dyed-in-the-wool Trump supporters and you ask ’em if there would have been any ad that they saw — Facebook, Twitter, wherever — that would have changed their mind and made ’em vote for Hillary.

And I’ll guarantee you out of every 10 you’re not gonna have more than nine people tell you you’re full of it. It may even be a smaller ratio than that. The dangerous thing here is you got guys like Messina and all these other people that are bragging about Obama’s brilliant campaign like the New York Times wrote about in 2013, making it look like they were Svengalis, they were brilliant, and they had the unique ability to generate all of those votes.

Rush is, as millennialspeak goes, “throwing shade” on the very notion that the Obama 2012 data game really had any effect.

Which is Rush’s roundabout way of agreeing with me.

Remember my missive:  At first, I drank the kool-aid that Obama’s data game was effective.  But then as the months rolled on after re-election, we found out from credible high sample size exit survey data that the niche constituency groups that the Obama data game was supposed to appeal to turned out a bit less than and voted Obama slightly less than they did four years prior.  Strike one.  Then people who looked at deep level precinct data found that working class whites weren’t feeling ole Willard, and stayed home enough to change the outcomes of enough important states.  As we know, WCWs generally don’t respond to the data game, because they’re generally not that visible to internet social media.  Now, what the Obama 2012 people did do well when it came to WCWs using the kind of media they use, was engage in anti-Romney FUD (Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt), and that did keep their turnout down.  But that had nothing to do with Faceberg.  Strike two.  Then came the dagger:  In the summer of 2013, the Census Bureau surveys and data on actual voter turnout showed the middle aged and especially elderly black women turned out in record numbers, even higher than they did in 2008, and we know who they voted for.  And we know that elderly black women aren’t exactly a wheel house Faceberg using demographic.  Strike three, you’re out.

The Obama 2012 data game was, again, as millennialspeak goes, a fail.

Fool Me Twice

28 02 2018


There’s something a little bit disconcerting going on within the Trump Tent.

What got me thinking about this and thinking this way is when we found out a few days ago that the OCGE is hiring his own digital-data-online manager from 2016, Brad Pascale, as his overall national campaign manager for 2020, (even though I don’t think he’ll have to worry about that).  On top of that, there’s this from a few days ago about the Trump 2016 campaign’s data game, and of course Pascale is mentioned.

What is disconcerting to me is that Trump is making the same mistake Obama did.

Remember, after Obama eked out re-election in 2012, for months and months after election day, all we heard about was the invincible juggernaut that was the Obama-DNC data game, and how it and it alone pushed Obama over the line.  Then in the middle of the next year, the Census Bureau released its voter turnout analysis, and found that the niche constituencies that the Obama 2012 data game heavily appealed to had lower turnout rates than they did in 2008, and that combined with other post-election surveys which showed that those same constituencies voted Obama at slightly less percentages (even if for him at landslide proportions) in 2012 compared to 2008, should have ended all the MUH DATA talk forever.  Too, for the fact that the constituency that saved Obama’s bacon in 2012, elderly black women (EBW), aren’t really on the data game radar, and also for the fact that the way the Obama-Romney politics worked out, swing state rust belt workding class whites (SS RB WCWs) just weren’t feeling Willard.

Yet and still, almost everyone that drank the MUH DATA kool-aid before mid-2013 kept on believing it.

Fast forward to the present, Trump is making the same mistake, assigning way too much credit to MUH DATA for his own win.  Hence, giving Pascale the store for 2020.

Seriously, are we to think that Trump was able to flip the 2012 script in 2016, lowering the turnout of EBW and boosting the turnout of SS RB WCWs, because of Pascale’s clever use of Facebook?  How many EBWs and SS RB WCWs are even on Facebook?  The answer is hardly any — Old fashioned politics caused their voting or non-voting habits both in 2012 and 2016.

Paranoia Is Sexy, Reality Is a Basic Bitch

21 11 2016


A few current years ago, if you read a lot of nodes that later came to be known as alt-right, you read these two speculated truisms about conventional politics:

(1) The Iraq War was such a debacle that the American national electorate would never again trust the Presidency to a Republican (or even a Democrat) that was too close to and comfortable with neoconservative foreign policy ideology.

(2) Paul Ryan’s toying around with relatively drastic changes in Social Security and Medicare cost Mitt Romney the state of Florida.

And what happened this year?

The Republican nominee all but wrote a promise in his own blood to leave SS&M as-is, and said with enough credible evidence to be believed that he opposed the Iraq War.

And guess what?  He won both Florida and the Presidency.

Among other reasons why he did.

Easy, practical, easily digestible.

But no, it’s much more sexy to cook up theories that Vladimir Putin hacked Facebook to insert fake news in its news feed.

Strange New Respect Mode: On

25 10 2016

Los Angeles


Obama: McCain and Romney Were ‘Honorable,’ Wouldn’t Have Worried About ‘General Course’ of US If They Had Won

On Monday’s broadcast of ABC’s “Jimmy Kimmel Live,” President Obama said of his former opponents Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney (R), “they’re both honorable men, and if they had won, then I wouldn’t worry about the general course of this country.”

Obama stated, “[T]here is something qualitatively different about the way Trump has operated in the political sphere. I — look, I ran against John McCain. I ran against Mitt Romney. Obviously, I thought that I could do a better job, but they’re both honorable men, and if they had won, then I wouldn’t worry about the general course of this country.”

Funny, I remember 2008 and 2012 pretty well; I was a thirtysomething during both of those election seasons, and I was lucky to squeeze out one more Presidential season as a thirtysomething. And what I remember is that John McCain was a dangerous hot head who would be Bush’s third term and couldn’t be trusted with his finger on the nuclear button, even though he was an old fogey klutz because he had never sent an e-mail in his life. Mitt Romney killed women because he denied them health care after having hog tied his dog to the roof of his gas guzzling SUV.

If nothing drastic changes in the country and Hillary wins, then four years from now, as Hillary is running for re-election versus the Republican nominee of 2020, everyone then will develop strange new respect for Donald Trump. “You know, at least he was a moderate-liberal on social issues, he openly appealed to LGBTQ, made Peter Thiel the first gay RNC speaker, and had some innovative proposals on a lot of things and genuinely cared about working people. Unlike the evil reprobate the Republicans sent up this year, a social issue Neanderthal and total elitist corporate-plutocrat shill who can’t deviate even one iota from conservative orthodoxy.”  In fact, I’m making this my first post in the new category “Campaign 2020” so we’ll be able to check back in four years to see if I’m right; of course, if Trump wins, I wouldn’t possibly be able to be right unless he declines to run for a second term.

It’s Nothing Now

11 10 2016


And it was nothing four years ago, either.

Claire, yesterday, to the WSJ:  It was just an accidental misstatement, a slight confusing of the science.  It’s no way as horrible as Trump’s locker room talk!

And I certainly agree.  Which is, in turn, no way as horrible as Bill Clinton’s actions and his wife’s attacks on the victims.

But let’s talk about Claire’s new found clarity about my former boss.

No Problems Here

28 08 2016


Note that the record for white Evangelicals voting Republicans is 79%, for Romney in 2012 and Bush in 2004.

Miss You Not

14 03 2016

Your Blogmeister’s Hotel Room

Ben Shapiro and Michelle (Corey didn’t assault me) Fields are leaving Breitbart.

Good for Breitbart.

Shapiro, one of the bigger Trump haters in the the neo-to-lamer right universe, was singing a different tune five years ago.


Excuse You

3 03 2016

Salt Lake City

We don’t need someone who, when he was running for President, deceitfully used Kris Kobach and immigration patriotism in order to scam his way into the nomination, then ditching both after he effectively won it, lecturing us about how another Presidential candidate is a phony and a fraud.


Patterson’s First Axiom

22 12 2015


Buckle up; I’m about to prove why Nicholas Stix calls me the country’s greatest living political scientist.

While I think Trump has way more support among blacks than the typical Republican Presidential candidate, resist the temptation to interpret this to mean that just because Trump’s percentage is highest in “minority center counties” means that Trump is actually getting that support from the minorities in minority center counties, read:  blacks in the Dixie black belt.  In reality, because of Patterson’s First Axiom, it is white voters in minority center counties that’s driving the Trump support.  Even this article tries to warn us of this:

The idea of Mr. Trump doing well in counties with large minority populations may seem counter-intuitive, but, remember, we’re focusing on a specific set of voters that live in those places: Republican primary voters. With that group, we are focusing almost solely on white voters who live in those counties. Even in states with large minority populations, the Republican primary electorate is more than 90% white.

However, there is some hidden good news in this fact:

Moreover, the analysis suggests that Mr. Trump has pockets of strength that could prove valuable in states, some of them beyond the South, that award delegates to the top vote-winner in each congressional district. Districts with a large minority population may not include large numbers of Republicans, but they award delegates, nonetheless. Winning those districts could yield Mr. Trump a sizeable cache of delegates in states such as South Carolina and California.

There’s another reason why Trump’s popularity among Southern whites who are surrounded by blacks is a good omen for Trump elsewhere in the country.  The white Republican primary voter in the Deep South is a very very good leading indicator of how working middle class whites outside the South will be able to warm up to a Republican nominee on general election day.  You may not remember this because of the conventional wisdom, but Mitt Romney didn’t win a single Deep South state during the primary season when the race was competitive; in fact, in some of them, he finished in third behind both Newt Gingrich and Rick Santorum.  I’m reminding you of this because the CW ever since November 2012 is that Romney had to take “extreme” positions to win Deep South primaries and this in turn hurt him in November, when in reality Romney didn’t win competitive Deep South primaries.  You saw sort of the same thing present in 2008, when the only two viable candidates left were John McCain and Mike Huckabee; the latter beat the former in some Southern primaries and caucuses after everyone else dropped out.  I interpret this to mean that a Republican candidate who can win over whites in Alabama in the spring has a chance to win over working-middle class whites in Michigan in the fall, and, vice-versa.  McCain and Romney could not, so they did not, respectively, and therefore lost the election.  This point will become relevant in a moment.

You can see a map of all the 2016 county types as designed by the communities project here. Note the green Minority Center counties running through North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. Many of those states vote on March 1; South Carolina votes even earlier. March 5 brings Kentucky and Louisiana. On March 8 is Mississippi.

This paragraph has caused me to figure out two mysteries.

First, why the RNC set up 2016 so that events before March 15 award delegates proportionately while events after March 15 award delegates winner take all.  That’s because just about all of the Southern primaries and caucuses go before March 15; what this means is that, on the margins, the RNC wants Dixie to have less influence in choosing the nominee or influencing the ultimate nominee than it would have if their contests were winner take all.  Post March 15 contests tend to be big delegate prizes outside the South, and, at least when the RNC enacted this provision, they thought those would be Jeb! friendly.  That way, the establishment-conservative split pre-3/15 would not mean that the conservative(s) who might win those states would get all the delegates from those states; Jeb! or whoever the party brass wants would get delegates proportional to their vote percentages.  But after 3/15, Jeb! wins Jeb! style states and win all of their delegates. Also, if Jeb! didn’t have to worry about actually finishing in first place in Alabama to get any delegates from Alabama, he wouldn’t have to try to appeal to enough of the kind of white voters that make Alabama Alabamay just to finish in first; he could RINO it up, finish in third, (even Alabama has its share of Republican establishment flunkies), and get some delegates anyway. He could walk away with delegates but also be able to brag to the media that he didn’t have to bother pandering to knuckledragging troglodytes, either.  The reason why I think the RNC wanted to cock block the South was because it buys into, and in fact, has helped to peddle, the post-Romney conventional wisdom I wrote about and refuted above.

Second, and in turn, this solves the mystery to why Jeb! said this inexplicable thing late last year; he knew (or he thought, at the time) that the RNC rigged the schedule and the game to make that possible.

The Myth of Four Million

29 11 2015


Relax, I said four, not six.

Turns out the “four million missing Republicans” line isn’t true.

Even when “four million” was believed and believable, the difference between your blogmeister and them is that I never believed the missing Republicans were doctrinaire conservatives who stayed home to punish Romney for his not being conservative enough, especially since we were told that these four million actually did show up to vote for the even less conservative John McCain in 2008.  Considering which EC-crucial states Romney only won slight majority but not landslide margins among whites and not enough to overcome the record high 45+ black women turnout, I figured even then that the whites in those states who couldn’t bring themselves to vote for Romney, and stayed home, were independent Republican leaning but not loyal blue and gray collar whites.  Sean Trende’s later analysis of 2012 non-voters confirmed my suspicion.

However, the reality is that Romney got a million more votes than McCain got in 2008, while Obama got 3.5 million fewer votes than he himself did four years prior.  That said, I still think Trende’s analysis is valid, considering what doomed Romney in states like Ohio were not big enough white margins.  What it also shows is that since Obama lost 3.5 million voters, but 45+ black women turnout was even higher than it was in 2012, is that Obama’s big data microtargeting strategy, which even I credited at first, was a big flop.

Brunner Is In, Officially

5 10 2015


For GOV-R.

He better have a platform beyond “Muh Handwipe” and “I’m against ObamaCare” if he wants to win this primary, otherwise, for me, it will feel like that I’m partying like it’s very early August 2012.

Of course, I have to say again, neither he nor any of the other Republicans have a chance versus Koster November next unless they openly disavow RTW.

Coming Around

14 07 2015


The Cook organization is finally coming around to understanding what Steve Sailer figured out more than two years ago:

Hispanics, not that important, very little political and Electoral College leverage. Blacks, very important, lots of political and Electoral College leverage, in fact, the difference maker in 2012 bar none.

However, I don’t think that blacks and the decisive role they play are “overlooked.”  I think a whole lot of important people have known this all along.  But it gave the Republican oriented donor class and the consultants who ride herd for them the opportunity to concoct a self-serving political myth that Hispanic voters are ultra-crucial and ultra-important, they want amnesty and open borders, and the way to win elections is to give the Republican donors the amnesty and open borders they want.

If blacks and their leverage weren’t well understood, the names Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown would have never become nationally known, and you’d be hearing nothing about Confederate flags today.

Citizen United

14 04 2015

Monticello, Iowa






The question above of why HRC needs $2.5 billion or even $2.5 thousand is a very good one.  First off, she already has the media on her side, NBC most of all, because they hired Chelsea Clinton in order to buy access to Hillary Clinton, and even though the younger Miss Clinton didn’t last long at NBC, Comcast is going to have to protect their investment by making sure HRC wins.  And by eschewing all that money, HRC can lead by example, or at least put on a front like she is.

Give and Take

13 04 2015


PowerLine, quoting Rubio’s announcement:

Both of my parents were born to poor families in Cuba. After his mother died when he was nine, my father left school to go work. My mother was one of seven girls raised by a disabled father who struggled to provide for his family.

When they were young, my parents had big dreams for themselves. But because they were not born into wealth or power, their future was destined to be defined by their past. So in 1956 they came here, to the one place on earth where the aspirations of people like them could be more than just dreams.

My father became a bartender. My mother a cashier, a maid and a Kmart stock clerk. They never made it big. But they were successful. Two immigrants with little money or education found stable jobs, owned a home, retired with security and gave all four of their children a life far better than their own.

My parents achieved what came to be known as the American Dream. But now, too many Americans are starting to doubt whether achieving that dream is still possible.

The 2012 Republican National Convention in Tampa had one speech after another after another like this.  The speakers, a lot of them non-white, spouted their Horatio Alger stories.  Marco Rubio was one of them, as a matter of fact.  Others like that included New Mexico Gov. Susana Martinez, and now Congresswoman Mia Love from Utah.

The reason why that convention turned out to be a big flop was that those speeches and those that gave them were appealing to an audience and a class of voters that doesn’t want to work for anything, doesn’t want to pay their dues to be a real success if they ever will be, doesn’t want to climb the ladder slowly and one step at a time.  They want it all, they want it now, and they want it given to them without obligation.  And that’s where Baracka Claus and the Democrats come in.

That’s what tends to happen when you try to be Democrat lite to compete with Democrat classic for the gibsmedat Democrat voter.

Maybe next time they’ll speak to the people that actually do vote for their crummy party or maybe the people who actually might but don’t quite.  Or do I wish for too much?

Needless to Say, I Don’t Agree

7 04 2015

Washington, D.C.

Paul Bedard, in the WE:

Norquist book: IRS assault on Tea Party saved Obama’s presidency

The administration-ordered persecution of Tea Party groups shut down the movement in time to save President Obama’s reelection and starve Republican Mitt Romney of the 4,262,296 votes needed to take the White House, according to an explosive new book from tax foe Grover Norquist.

Okay, now it’s time for that inside-the-box thinking that I’m famous for.

1.  Establishment Republicans were as much of a driving force behind IRSgate was were Democrats-Obama.

2.  The TPM was never hot for Romney.  Even if they were at full strength, they would not have wanted to mobilize in favor of Willard.  Besides, the hundreds of millions of dollars budget Romney campaign had enough money and people to do its own GOTV such that it never needed to rely on the nickel and dime budget TPM groups’ pavement pounding operations.  That the Romney campaign didn’t and couldn’t is its own fault entirely.

3.  The 4,262,296 people who did not vote for Romney who did vote for McCain four years earlier would not have been more likely to vote for Romney even if the TPM was at full strength and all in for Romney.  About two weeks ago, I wrote as a comment in this space:

It all comes down to this: There were around 4 million people who did vote for John McCain in 2008 who did not vote for Mitt Romney in 2012. These are the famous “four million missing Republicans” that lamestream conservative talking heads talk about and go on and on about.

And it is the severe misinterpretation of who they are, where they are, why they are, and why they didn’t vote in 2012, that’s going to drive the Republicans into yet another loss in 2016.

The conventional wisdom among lamer con talking heads is that the four million missing Republicans were lamer cons who gave Mitt Romney a lamer con purity test which he somehow failed, so they stayed home. Therefore, the “solution” is merely to run a more “pure,” more articulate, better credentialed lamer con up the flagpole, and everything will be fine. And that’s why Ted Cruz thinks he can win this whole shooting match.

Except for? Well, everything.

First off, John McCain was even less conservative than Romney, so it’s strange for people doing lamer con litmus tests to think that McCain passed it but Romney didn’t.

Second, Sean Trende already did the difficult leg work (or rather, finger work) and found out who the 4 million missing Republicans are. As it turns out, on a county by county basis, there is a very very strong correlation between the percent of voters in the county that consists of these missing Republicans and the county’s percent vote for Ross Perot in 1992. Meaning the missing “Republicans” aren’t doctrinaire conservatives, not even strong Republicans. They’re working-middle class white independents, once upon a time they were called “Reagan Democrats.” Their non voting means that Romney couldn’t win the Great Lakes states’ white voters by the landslide margins he needed to to overcome the black elderly women deluge. And it should be no surprise now that working-middle class whites in the Great Lakes had no desire to turn out for someone who, if he had never gone into politics, would be a hedge fund multi billionaire by now.

Back to Norquist’s theory:

First, he cited a study on the Tea Party movement that found it pushed up to 5.8 million extra Republican voters to the polls in 2010 when the GOP took control of the House, essentially shutting down Obama’s agenda.

I have no doubt about the veracity of that.  But, “extra Republican voters in 2010” compared to what?  It can’t be compared to 2008, because Prez years have bigger turnouts than midterms.  It has to be 2010 delta 2006, the previous midterm.  And if that’s the case, then of course it would be much easier to motivate Republicans to turn out, because 2006 was the sixth year of a Republican President, and the second midterm of a two-term President is almost always great for the “opposition” party.  While 2010 was the first midterm of what turned out to be a two-term Democrat President.  What I’d like to know, but what only God Himself knows, is how many of those 5.8 million Republicans 10 delta 6 would have voted anyway even if the TPM never existed, that they did just out of pure partisan reaction, and how many were actually a result of TPM pavement pounding.



Mr. Choom Gang Wants Us to Quit Thinking About Weed

17 03 2015

Washington, D.C.

You’ve got a lot of nerve.

Remember, the whole purpose of Colorado Amendment 64 was to put weed legalization on the same ballot on the same day as the Presidential election in order to swing Colorado to Obama.

Though it probably wouldn’t have mattered anyway.

They Knew Even Then

4 02 2015

Washington, D.C.


Axelrod: Romney ‘12 concession call ‘irritated’ Obama

President Barack Obama was not amused by Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential election concession call, according to a new memoir.

In “Believer: My 40 Years in Politics,” former senior Obama adviser David Axelrod writes that the GOP candidate implied on the call that Obama had won because of his popularity in black communities, according to the New York Daily News, which acquired an advance copy of the book.

Obama was “unsmiling during the call, and slightly irritated when it was over,” according to Axelrod.

“‘You really did a great job of getting out the vote in places like Cleveland and Milwaukee,’ in other words, black people. That’s what he thinks this was all about,” Obama said after he hung up with Romney.

And that irritated Obama?  As the Census Bureau data released the next June proved, it was the truth.  In fact, I’m sure Obama had already concluded months before election day that it’s something he and his campaign needed to do.  I guess he’s only mad that Romney noticed it.  In fact, it was half the equation to explain how Obama eked it out:  His campaign did a great job of turning out middle aged and elderly black women (the only two demographics whose 2012 turnout increased over 2008), and the other half was Romney’s inability to run up landslide margins among working/middle class whites in northern swing states.  And that happened partially because of the Obama campaign’s anti-Romney FUD, but most of that was Romney’s own doings.

But the big bombshell here, if you’re paying close attention, is that even on election night, Mitt Romney and his campaign already knew half the answer, that it was high (elderly) black (woman) turnout.  If Romney knew it, then the RINO establishment knew it.  This means that we now know that they knew all along that their peddling of this ZOMG GREAT HISPANIC VOTER TIDAL WAVE LOL~!!!!1 line and “we gotta do amnesty because Mitt lost Hispanics severely” line postmortem was and still is deceitful bullshit.  That is, of course, an example of what I concluded my last post with:  Power creating its own truth.  In the case, the power of the cheap labor open borders lobby.

Do the Jebby

15 12 2014

Washington, D.C.


In New Election, Jeb Bush Stakes Out the Middle Ground

WASHINGTON — When former Gov. Jeb Bush of Florida quietly visited Senator John McCain in his Capitol Hill office this fall, discussion turned to a subject of increasing interest to Mr. Bush: how to run for president without pandering to the party’s conservative base.

“I just said to him, ‘I think if you look back, despite the far right’s complaints, it is the centrist that wins the nomination,’ ” Mr. McCain, an Arizona Republican, said he told Mr. Bush.

In the past few weeks, Mr. Bush has moved toward a run for the White House. His family’s resistance has receded. His advisers are seeking staff. And the former governor is even slimming down, shedding about 15 pounds thanks to frequent swimming and personal training sessions after a knee operation last year.

But before pursuing the presidency, Mr. Bush, 61, is grappling with the central question of whether he can prevail in a grueling primary battle without shifting his positions or altering his persona to satisfy his party’s hard-liners. In conversations with donors, friends and advisers, he is discussing whether he can navigate, and avoid being tripped up by, the conservative Republican base.

Asking President John McCain for advice on how to win?  Great Idea!

Actually, 2008 does provide the template on how Bush can win the nomination while running as a non-conservative, because it’s how McCain did it that year — A whole conga line of conservatives or pseudo-conservatives will get into the race in order to pad their resumes or satisfy their egos.  They’ll split the conservative vote, and the media-favored “moderate” will win almost all of the early primaries and caucuses with 25-30% of the vote, but get all of the delegates from those states because of winner-take-all.  Eventually, the media-favored “moderate” keeps on ekeing out so many wins with laughably puny plurality percentages but gathers such a big delegate lead combined with the media mindshare that opposing him eventually becomes futile, and everyone else either literally drops out or quits campaigning, meaning the media-favored “moderate” will win the later primaries with landslide percentages.

The party’s establishment elites and some longtime advisers to Mr. Bush are urging him to remain steadfast on his positions, especially on immigration, if he runs. They are convinced that Mitt Romney ruined his chance to win in the fall of 2012 by veering too far to the right during the primaries, turning off general election voters as a result.

I can forgive people for not being adept at the relatively obscure political history that happened before they were born, but self-styled political experts should know a lot better about the political history of not even three years ago.  Willard Romney never veered to the right at all.  He never won a single Southern primary or caucus while Gingrich and/or Santorum were viable; in fact, in Alabama and Mississippi, Romney finished in third place behind both.  Romney won the nomination by being the favored Republican candidate of Republican voters in blue states and of Republican voters in blue counties in competitive states.  What he didn’t realize is that blue states and blue counties are blue because they have more blue voters than red voters, so while he could easily win Massachusetts or New Jersey or Wayne County, Michigan or Cuyahoga County, Ohio in the primary season, they were inevitably going to be blue in November because they have way more many Democrat voters than moderate Republican voters.  Meanwhile, Alabama and Mississippi were right there for Romney in November, and while Romney didn’t win Ohio or Michigan in the fall, just about all the Santorum counties in the spring in those states were Romney counties in the fall.

One thing that became perfectly clear in the 2012 aftermath is that Romney’s inability to sell himself to white Southerners in the spring was a very good proxy of the problems he would have in selling himself to non-Southern white working class voters in the fall.

My Audacious Contention

30 10 2014


“War on women” a dud in 2014.

Strap on the seat belts, because  I’m about to make an audacious contention that brings a lot of clarity to stories like these:

“War on women” had very little to do with the way 2012 turned out.

It’s just that Democrats pounded that line into the ground two years ago, and they happened to do well, so they made the usual correlation-causation mistake, and trotted out war on women again this year.

This is all aside from the fact that there is no war on women.

You Forgot Two Words

27 10 2014



Why House Republicans Alienate Hispanics: They Don’t Need Them

Political analysts keep urging the Republican Party to do more to appeal to Hispanic voters. Yet the party’s congressional leaders show little sign of doing so, blocking an immigration overhaul and harshly criticizing President Obama for his plan to defer deportation for undocumented migrants.

House Republican leaders want amnesty legislation badly, but they can’t find a way to con the back benchers into voting for it.  They might “harshly criticize President Obama for his” potential executive order amnesty in public to save face, but in private, they’re hoping he does.  If he does, the Republican establishment is going to throw a really big party in a soundproof room.

The fact that the Republican House majority does not depend on Hispanic voters helps explain why immigration reform has not become law, even though national Republican strategists believe the party needs additional support among Hispanic voters to compete in presidential elections. It’s true that Republicans would stand little, if any, chance of winning the presidency in 2016 if they lost every Hispanic voter. If anything, the Republicans probably need to make gains among Hispanic voters to compete in states like Florida and Nevada.

The fact that members of Congress face election every two years and are more likely to face pissed off voters if their paw prints were actually on an amnesty bill is a better explanation.

But Congressional elections are different. Although the young, urban and racially diverse Democratic coalition has won the popular vote in five of the last six presidential elections, that coalition has not delivered House control to the Democrats. Gerrymandering isn’t the only cause, either. It’s the way the population is distributed.

That last sentence is crucial, because I’ll have a link to another story below.

The Upshot analysis found that if not one of the eight million Hispanic voters supported the Republican candidate, Republicans would lose about a dozen House seats, especially in Florida and California. The loss of those seats would make the Republican House majority more vulnerable if Democrats made gains elsewhere in future years. But given the Republicans’ current strength across rural areas and in conservative suburbs, the loss of every Hispanic every voter would not be enough to cost them the 17 seats that would flip House control.

And this analysis is a bit faulty because it relies on two Latin words:  Ceteris Paribus.  They just fiddle with the Hispanic vote without fiddling with the white vote or any other vote.  In the real political world, Ceteris Paribus does not exist.  Everything you do to get one person to vote for you will cost you statistically speaking some decimal number of voters, hopefully for your sake it’s a decimal less than 1.00.  I think that Republican attempts to appeal to Hispanics yields a higher than 1.00 decimal, i.e. they lose far many more white votes with their Hispandering than Hispanic votes they gain, in fact I think the ratio is way way way higher than 1.00.

The Republican lead in the race for control of the Senate, on the other hand, does not include such a cushion. A percentage point could make the difference in several of this year’s crucial contests, and winning every Hispanic vote might be worth a point to the Democrats — even in states with a small Hispanic population. Hispanic voters will represent about 3 percent of the electorate in the Senate battlegrounds.

We did a special run of our Senate model, Leo, imagining that the Republicans lost every Hispanic voter. In this situation, the odds flip — precisely, as it happens. Republicans would have just a 31 percent chance of retaking the Senate, compared with the current chance of 69 percent on Monday. Without any Hispanic votes, Republicans would lose a bit of ground everywhere, but become decided underdogs in Colorado and find themselves in a tight race in Texas.

Yet the Republicans would still have a plausible path to victory — as plausible as the actual Democratic path — because they could pick up the six Democratic seats they needed elsewhere. In South Dakota, Montana, West Virginia, Louisiana, Arkansas, Iowa, Alaska, North Carolina and New Hampshire, there are very few Hispanic voters.

Thom Tillis in North Carolina, sizable Hispanic population, has a better than even chance to lose next Thursday precisely because he’s a Hispanderer and open borders all the way.  He won’t win very many Hispanic votes by doing it (they already have Kay Hagan), and he’ll drive away white votes.  Because Senate races are statewide affairs, the opposite of ceteris paribus being true becomes statistically more crucial, and because Hispanics punch well under their demographic weight even in Presidential cycles and are even less than that in midterms, white voters become all the more crucial with their marginal leverage.

Perhaps most remarkable is that we’re even entertaining this notion. In reality, the Republicans will win millions of Hispanic votes this November. But the House Republican majority does not depend on those votes. Indeed, it could even withstand losses far beyond reason.

Republicans in general this season will do better among the scant few Hispanic voters than the 27% that Mitt Romney did among Hispanics in 2012, precisely because Republicans this season are generally in a stronger position.

To win the White House in 2016 or any future year, the Republicans will need a substantial number of Hispanic votes.

No they will not.  This same newspaper did this same kind of analysis of Presidential votes and the Electoral College in 2012, and found that, ceteris paribus, Romney would have needed to get 73% of the Hispanic vote to win.  No Republican Presidential candidate in my lifetime has ever gotten anywhere near 50% of the Hispanic vote, much less 73%.  The high water mark was Bush’s 40% in 2004.  Then there’s the fact again that ceteris paribus does not exist in the real world.  The more the Republicans try to get Hispanic votes, the way more white people they will run off.

But the fact that the party doesn’t need many of those votes to hold the House makes the Republican effort to appeal to Hispanic voters far more challenging. The Republican Congress has few, if any, immediate incentives to reach a compromise on immigration reform or otherwise reach out to Hispanics.

Hispanic voters don’t have “immigration reform” (amnesty, open borders, border surge) as their huge priority.  They’re mainly social welfare and government giveaway voters.

Now, for the second article:

Early voting has started in states nationwide, and Election Day is drawing near. And when the votes begin to be counted, the Republican Party will have a built-in advantage as it seeks to keep control of the House of Representatives.

The reason? A years long plan by Republican strategists to take advantage of the 2010 census and reshape congressional districts in key states to pack large numbers of Democrats into relatively few House districts, while GOP voters are spread out more evenly.

Gerrymandering, as it is called, has a long history in the United States, ardently pursued by both Democrats and Republicans. But the Republicans’ success was unprecedented and largely out of the public eye.

However, you can read a hint above that this is off base.  In fact, last year, the NYT did a big computer analysis of the 2012 Congressional (House) candidate vote.  Democrat House candidates got slightly more votes than Republican House candidates, but the winners based on those votes were 233 R to 202 D.  Everyone, including me, just assumed that the 2011-2012 redistricting, largely done in state legislatures that were based on state legislature elections of the 2010 red wave, was the only thing that kept the House Republican in spite of a slight Democrat generic voter win.  However, the NYT fed the actual 2012 House two-party voting data into hundreds of possible national House district configuration maps, ranging from seemingly insanely pro-Democrat maps to seemingly insanely pro-Republican maps, and also the current real world map.  It found that only a scant few of the craziest Democrat-favorable maps would have resulted in a Democrat majority based on actual 2012 votes, meaning that almost all of the pro-Democrat maps, all of the neutral maps and all of the Republican maps would have resulted in what we actually got, that is, a Republican majority.  They also found that the real world map is not a wacky crazy pro-Republican map, that it’s about in the middle ground of hypothetical Republican-friendly maps.  That makes sense, because there were some state legislatures that were in Democrat hands in 2011 and 2012 that gerrymandered in favor of the blue team, such as Illinois and California.

The reason is what this first NYT article says above.  As long as Democrat voters willingly clump into tight geographical areas, they will be at a natural disadvantage in Congressional politics.  Not Republican gerrymandering, Democrat self-ghettoization.

Besides, what this AP advisory forgets is that Republicans have a blue team political ally when they do gerrymandering:  Black Democrats and the NAACP.  The Missouri map for this decade which means a 6-2 Republican majority save some sort of drastic turn of events was a map that black politicians in the General Assembly voted for twice, both to implement and to override Nixon’s veto, the NAACP in St. Louis and Kansas City approved, and the then and still two black Congressmen from Missouri, Lazy Clay and Beaver Cleaver, also endorsed.

If the AP is trying to manufacture an excuse for what is pretty much a foregone conclusion, that Republicans will hold onto the House and probably gain a few more seats, something else they’re forgetting is that this year, unlike two years ago, Republicans will almost certainly win the generic House candidate vote, too.

In Case You Were Wondering

10 07 2014

Your Blogmeister’s Desk


I’ve been telling you that I haven’t finished spilling all the beans because certain people have kindly requested that I hold back until the timing is right.  What I knew but didn’t say myself here is that “right timing” meant that Todd wanted to tell his side of the story, and he wanted to do that first.  I highly suspected that his side of the story was going to be in book form.  A theory which was proven right yesterday when a brown truck delivered me an author-autographed copy of this book.

The way I figure, it won’t be long until it goes on sale to the general public that I’ll get the okay to spill the final bean, that is, why he didn’t drop out of the race.  That is something this book does not really cover.  There is a subtle hint on the cover of this book:  The words “party bosses.”  A few weeks ago, I dropped another hint, that is, if you were paying attention.

What it does do most crucially, I think, is show that the huge mistake was acknowledging the remarks at all.  I remember thinking to myself the Monday after that the whole thing would blow over by the end of the week.  I should have paid closer attention to myself; if I would have, I would have yelled and screamed at everyone to ignore this thing, not to say anything about it in public, not to fuel the non-troversy, and it probably would have blown over.  It wasn’t until the middle of November when it was all over anyway that this conclusion of what I and we should have done hit me like a ton of bricks.  Todd’s mentality is that his apology fueled and in fact endorsed the smear and the paranoia, and he’s right about that.  It’s just that I go one step further:  The apology would not have happened without our acknowledgment, and that’s what really added fuel to the fire.

Gerrymandering Schmarrymandering

27 01 2014


Turns out the conventional wisdom parroted by both the political class and yours truly about the 2011 gerrymanders helping the Republicans in the House in 2012 was mostly fatuous. The takeaway is that the study did lots and lots and lots of simulations of the November 2012 Congressional vote based on differing Congressional districts, and found that it was virtually impossible to draw a map that would have delivered the House to the Democrats.

We get a mention:

The results were not encouraging for reform advocates. In the vast majority of states, our nonpartisan simulations produced Republican seat shares that were not much different from the actual numbers in the last election. This was true even in some states, like Indiana and Missouri, with heavy Republican influence over redistricting. Both of these states were hotly contested and leaned only slightly Republican over all, but of the 17 seats between them, only four were won by Democrats (in St. Louis, Kansas City, Gary and Indianapolis). While some of our simulations generated an additional Democratic seat around St. Louis or Indianapolis, most of them did not, and in any case, a vanishingly small number of simulations gave Democrats a congressional seat share commensurate with their overall support in these states.

Except in terms of Presidential politics in 2012, Missouri was not “hotly contested.”  That Romney was going to win it was a foregone conclusion that both the Romney and Obama campaigns drew in the spring of 2012.  If you lived in St. Louis or Kansas City media markets during the fall of 2012, you didn’t see one Presidential media buy.  That’s because those media markets cover three states that were foregone conclusions:  Kansas (Romney), Missouri (Romney), Illinois (Obama).

As far as I know, Indiana wasn’t really contested, either, in terms of Presidential politics.

As far as Congressional redistricting, one big giant X-factor that the author of this piece doesn’t mention is this:  Blacks.  Gerrymandering to help white liberals in order to hurt white conservatives also hurts blacks.  This is why during the 2011 redistricting process here in Missouri, the politics of which took place in the very building in which I am currently writing this blog post, Republicans and black Democrats teamed up to give us our current map, because the current map benefits Republicans and black Democrats.  And besides, why are white liberals bitching?  It’s not as if a black Democrat member of Congress is going to vote against white liberal hobby horse issues anyway.

If the white partisan split in House elections overall was around 51 R 49 D, then the liberal Democrats would have a point about gerrymandering.  But in reality, it’s around 60-40, and that means that even favorable Democrat gerrymanders wouldn’t make much of a difference.


Consider last year in Virginia.  Democrats eked out the statewide offices, but Republicans won 67 of 100 seats in the State House (House of Delegates).  However, considering the generic vote, Republicans got more votes than Democrats, significantly more, when examining House of Delegate elections alone.  The Democrats that won statewide only won because of the big margins they ran up among Federal workers, blacks and immigrants in suburban D.C., Richmond and Norfolk.  But there was probably no way to draw a map of the House of Delegates to engineer anything close to a Democrat majority.


12 01 2014

Arlington, Virginia

The Hill, on the Clinton, Inc. making a list and checking it twice:

When the Clintons sat in judgment, Claire McCaskill got the seat closest to the fire. Bill and Hillary had gone all out for her when she ran for Senate in Missouri in 2006. But McCaskill seemed to forget that favor when NBC’s Tim Russert asked her whether Bill had been a great president, during a “Meet the Press” debate against then-Sen. Jim Talent in October 2006.

“He’s been a great leader,” McCaskill said of Bill, “but I don’t want my daughter near him.”

Instantly, McCaskill regretted her remark; the anguish brought her “to the point of epic tears,” according to a friend. She knew the comment had sounded much more deliberate than a forgivable slip of the tongue. So did Hillary, who immediately canceled a planned fundraiser for McCaskill.

A few days later McCaskill called Bill Clinton to offer a tearful apology. Bill was gracious, which just made McCaskill feel worse. After winning the seat, she was terrified of running into Hillary Clinton in the Capitol. “I really don’t want to be in an elevator alone with her,” McCaskill confided to the friend.

But Hillary, who was just then embarking on her presidential campaign, still wanted something from McCaskill—the Missourian’s endorsement. Women’s groups, including EMILY’s List, pressured McCaskill to jump aboard the Clinton bandwagon, and Hillary courted her new colleague personally, setting up a one-on-one lunch in the Senate Dining Room in early 2007. Rather than ask for her support directly, Hillary took a softer approach, seeking common ground on the struggles of campaigning, including the physical toll. “There’s a much more human side to Hillary,” McCaskill thought.

Obama, meanwhile, was pursuing her too, in a string of conversations on the Senate floor. Clearly, Hillary thought she had a shot at McCaskill. But for McCaskill, the choice was always whether to endorse Obama or stay on the sidelines. In January 2008 she not only became the first female senator to endorse Obama but she also made the case to his team that her support would be amplified if Govs. Kathleen Sebelius and Janet Napolitano came out for him at roughly the same time.

McCaskill offered up a small courtesy, calling Hillary’s personal aide, Huma Abedin, ahead of the endorsement to make sure it didn’t blindside Hillary.

But the trifecta of women leaders giving Obama their public nod was a devastating blow. Hate is too weak a word to describe the feelings that Hillary’s core loyalists still have for McCaskill, who seemed to deliver a fresh endorsement of Obama—and a caustic jab at Hillary—every day during the primary.

And why did all these prominent women break early for Obama over HRC?  Because…Reverse Queen Bee Syndrome aka Female Crabs in a Bucket Syndrome.

As someone who was on the other side of Claire McCaskill’s ledger in 2012, from my vantage point, she got absolutely no help from Clinton, Inc. that year.

Many of the other names on the traitor side of the ledger were easy to remember, from Ted Kennedy to John Lewis, the civil rights icon whose defection had been so painful that Bill Clinton seemed to be in a state of denial about it. In private conversations, he tried to explain away Lewis’s motivations for switching camps midstream, after Obama began ratcheting up pressure for black lawmakers to get on “the right side of history.”

Lewis, because of his own place in American history and the unique loyalty test he faced with the first viable black candidate running for president, is a perfect example of why Clinton aides had to keep track of more detailed information than the simple binary of for and against. Perhaps someday Lewis’s betrayal could be forgiven.

Ted Kennedy (another seven on the hit list) was a different story.

He had slashed Hillary worst of all, delivering a pivotal endorsement speech for Obama just before the Super Tuesday primaries that cast her as yesterday’s news and Obama as the rightful heir to Camelot. He did it in conjunction with a New York Times op-ed by Caroline Kennedy that said much the same thing in less thundering tones. Bill Clinton had pleaded with Kennedy to hold off, but to no avail.

John Lewis is easy to explain — Race race race race race.  Ted Kennedy endorsing Obama over HRC is harder to figure, but I think I know the answer, though it might be an answer he took to his grave so we’ll never be able to confirm in this world — One hint to the answer is the use of the word “Camelot” here.  The only Kennedy that was ever President was John, and only for 1,036 days.  If HRC would have been elected President in 2008, it would have meant that the Clintons would have instantly become more of a credible Democrat Presidential dynasty than the Kennedys, by definition of two different Clintons winning the White House as opposed to just one Kennedy.  If I’m right, look for either an above or below the surface jihad from the remaining living political Kennedys to bring down HRC when the Presidential campaign season begins in the second half of next year going into early 2016.

Other reasons why I don’t think HRC is inevitable in 2016.

Junior Partner

3 11 2013


I’ve never believed the notion that some of our favorite websites have been pushing that Romney picked Paul Ryan as a running mate at the behest of consultants, barnacles and donors.  I’ve tended to the theory that Romney elevating younger “talent” like Ryan up the ladder ahead of what is considered normal schedule was a feature of his managerial style in the world of business.

Drudge today has been splashing heavy this Time expose mainly about what scared the Romney campaign away from Krispy Christie, but in passing, my sensibilities have been confirmed:

Mitt meditated on the choice that now seemed inevitable: Ryan. Beyond all the political pros and cons, Romney felt comfortable with Paul. He reminded Mitt of junior partners he used to work with at Bain: eager, earnest, solicitous, smart and not at all threatening. Bob White had a phrase for these buttoned-down go-getters, which he applied to Ryan: “client-ready.”

That will get missed, but at least the good news is that dirty laundry is starting to show up re Christie.  Not soon enough to keep him from winning a second term as New Jersey Governor on Tuesday, but this will very likely seriously hurt his Presidential chops.

And as a Jeff Sessions guy, that suits me just fine.


Now on the heels of this, Romney comes out and says that Krispy Christie can win the Republican nomination in 2016 and save the party.

Great idea, nominate a northeastern moderate.

If Romney loves Christie so much, why did he pick Ryan instead of Christie?  The first link in this story answers all.

But I Repeat Myself

10 10 2013


Ever since IRSgate broke, I’ve been very skeptical of the theory that it influenced 2012 by depressing Republican turnout.  First off, the TPM was never hot for Romney, second, Romney had plenty of money on his own to do GOTV.  His losing is entirely his fault.  Hell, the Romney campaign’s election day GOTV software base was so bad and untested that the sonofabitch crashed when the Romney campaign tried to crank it up on the morning of election day.

But we have a lame quantitative attempt to “prove” that:

Study finds IRS suppression of Tea Party swung 2012 election

A new study by the American Enterprise Institute — “Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence From The Tea Party Movement” — finds that the movement boosted Republican turnout by three to six million votes in the 2010 election. This effect was blunted in the 2012 election, though, because growth in the movement stalled.

That slowdown happened, co-author and AEI economist Stan Veuger notes, at the same time that the IRS began coming down hard on these groups. He argues in a article that this most likely had a major impact in the 2012 election.

“The founders, members, and donors of new Tea Party groups found themselves incapable of exercising their constitutional rights, and the Tea Party’s impact was muted in the 2012 election cycle,” Veuger said.

He added: “The data show that, had the Tea Party groups continued to grow at the pace seen in 2009 and 2010, and had their effect on the 2012 vote been similar to that seen in 2010, they would have brought the Republican Party as many as 5 to 8.5 million votes compared to Obama’s victory margin of 5 million.”

Given those numbers, it is reasonable to be suspicious of the IRS targeting, Veuger said.

The AEI study was done by Veuger, Andreas Madestam of Stockholm University, and Daniel Shoag and David Yanagizawa-Drott, both from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

The big problem with this study?  As the investment commercials always tell us, past returns are not automatically indicative of future results.

I can believe that the TPM efforts boosted Republican turnout in 2010 over 2008 by a 3-6m delta.  What I cannot automatically be made to believe is that it would have kept on bringing in more voters, 5-8.5m delta on top of that, in 2012 over 2010, had Obama and the RINOs combined not sicked the IRS on it.  What is very possible is that the TPM in 2009 and 2010 plucked a lot of sweet easy low hanging fruit, but there was no fruit to be had any higher on the tree.

Affirmative Obama

18 09 2013



Washington Examiner:

Book: Black donors forced nearly all-white Obama campaign to recruit black aide

In April 2012, the Obama re-election campaign posted a photo of a staff meeting on its Tumblr account. The aides in the picture were young, casually dressed, and enthusiastic — and nearly all white. The campaign took heat on the Internet for a remarkable lack of diversity, particularly since the staff was working to re-elect the first black president in U.S. history.

Now, a new book filled with inside information from the campaign reports that top Obama aides were also taking heat from key donors and supporters. In The Message: The Reselling of President Obama, author Richard Wolffe writes that influential black supporters were unhappy with the lack of black aides in top campaign roles. The supporters were so unhappy that they forced the campaign to search for African-Americans to fill senior roles in the effort. After months of searching, the campaign found exactly one.

Obama need not have bothered.  What, did anyone think he wasn’t going to get almost 100% of the black vote from a black turnout that wasn’t going to be at least as high as 2008?  (Higher, as it turned out.)  The only people who were so delusional as to be in that category were race pandering lamestream conservatives.  Why buy a cow when you’re getting the milk for free?

Eight Point Four Percent

3 06 2013


Wow.  The voting wave of the future. Hispanics were a big 8.4% of the 2012 electorate.

Remember that NYT slider-calculator a month or two ago that showed that even if Romney got 70% of the Hispanic vote, holding all other things equal, he still wouldn’t have won? Remember, that was based on exit polling data that we now know overhyped and overstated the Hispanic vote. I now think that Romney still would have lost even if he got 100% of the Hispanic vote.

Meanwhile, 700,000 more white votes in four states, and Romney is President right now.

Sailer notes that the really crucial fulcrum demographic for Obama last year was elderly black women.  Sociologically, that alludes to the matriarchial nature of traditional black African societies.  That also confirms what I have observed both first hand and second hand from trusted sources, that black voters are disproportionately upper middle aged to elderly black women.  Sure, the emaciated blonde in South Florida keeps touting out the hobby horse that 20% of black men under 30 voted Romney (hint, Ann — that means 80% voted for Obama), but young black men hardly vote.  If 100% of black men under 30 voted Republican, it would not change the outcome of one state’s Electoral College votes, one Senate race, one Congressional race, or even as much as one race for dog catcher.

I Grokketh Not

20 05 2013


I’m not liking this meme I’m starting to hear develop all over conservative talk radio, that IRSgate was the proximate causation for Romney not winning.

While I definitely believe that IRSgate came straight from the top, i.e. the current resident at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, and was designed to bog the TPM down in Mickey Mouse paperwork to keep it from being effective, and to harass big donors to Romney and Republican organizations and TPM organizations, I do not think that that can totally explain why Romney didn’t win.  That’s because the TPM was never too hot for Romney, and he wasn’t exactly hurting for money, either.  What explains Romney not winning is that incumbent politicians are very hard to beat, and not enough white conservatives were jazzed to show up and vote for an open borders RINO.

Related:  Stupid and Evil



3 05 2013


Byron York, in the Washington Examiner:

In 2012, President Obama famously won 71 percent of the Hispanic vote to Mitt Romney’s 27 percent. If all other factors remained the same, how large a percentage of the Hispanic vote would Romney have had to win to capture the White House?

What if Romney had won 44 percent of the Hispanic vote, the high-water mark for Republicans achieved by George W. Bush in 2004?  [Bullshit, it was at most 40%, maybe as low as 35% — Blogmeister] As it turns out, if Romney had hit that [non-existent — Blogmeister] Bush mark, he still would have lost, with 240 electoral votes to 298 for Obama.

But what if Romney had been able to make history and attract 50 percent of Hispanic voters? What then? He still would have been beaten, 283 electoral votes to 255.

What if Romney had been able to do something absolutely astonishing for a Republican and win 60 percent of the Hispanic vote? He would have lost by the same margin, 283 electoral votes to 255.

But what if Romney had been able to reach a mind-blowing 70 percent of the Hispanic vote? Surely that would have meant victory, right? No, it wouldn’t. Romney still would have lost, although by the narrowest of electoral margins, 270 to 268. (Under that scenario, Romney would have won the popular vote but lost in the Electoral College; he could have racked up huge numbers of Hispanic votes in California, New York and Texas, for example, and not changed the results in those states.)

According to the Times’ calculator, Romney would have had to win 73 percent of the Hispanic vote to prevail in 2012. Which suggests that Romney, and Republicans, had bigger problems than Hispanic voters.

The most serious of those problems was that Romney was not able to connect with white voters who were so turned off by the campaign that they abandoned the GOP and in many cases stayed away from the polls altogether. Recent reports suggest as many as 5 million white voters simply stayed home on Election Day. If they had voted at the same rate they did in 2004, even with the demographic changes since then, Romney would have won.

Likewise, the white vote is so large that an improvement of 4 points — going from 60 percent to 64 percent of those whites who did vote — would have won the race for Romney.

Okay, which is easier for a Republican Presidential candidate to do?  Get 4% more of the white vote, or totally invert the Hispanic vote?

Yet, the Stupid Party at least in an official sense is panicking over the Hispanic vote, and pushing for amnesty based on chasing the Hispanic vote.  It’s stupid stunts like that which keep crucial swing state crucial white voters at home.  Which was THE difference in 2012.

Moral of this story:  A few working middle class whites in the rust belt have more leverage over who does and does not get to be President than half of all Hispanic voters.